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Abstract
This paper argues that existing matching models with unemployment as an active
search and nonparticipation as an inactive search predict counterfactual results:
the unemployment rate is more than two times as volatile as the employment-
population ratio; only 20 percent of the actual volatility of the unemployment
rate is accounted for; and the labor market variables are perfectly correlated with
each other. This paper proposes a modiﬁed matching model in which workers
are classiﬁed after matches take place. The modiﬁed model generates the direct
transition from nonparticipation to employment with no assumption that non-
participation is an inactive search and without adjusting the time period of the
model. The model also explains the important cyclical features of the U.S. labor
market.
1 Introduction
In the standard search and matching model, unemployment captures both (i)those who
have not found employment or have separated and (ii)those who are currently looking
¤I am deeply indebted to Mark Bils for his guidance and suggestion. For helpful comments I
thank A´rpa´d A´braha´m, Gordon Dahl and John Long. I am also grateful for the comments of seminar
participants at the Korea Development Institute and the Bank of Korea. The usual disclaimer applies.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the
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for work. The current-period unemployment is then determined by the former, and it
also determines the latter.
According to the deﬁnition of “unemployed persons” of the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS), the unemployed are persons aged 16 years and older who had no employment
during the reference week and had made speciﬁc eﬀorts to ﬁnd employment sometime
during the 4-week period ending with the reference week.1 The CPS deﬁnition demon-
strates that the unemployed are those who searched but did not ﬁnd employment.
Recent studies about the labor force participation which attempt to distinguish
between unemployment and nonparticipation have neglected the feature of unemploy-
ment that the unemployed are those who ﬁnd no employment by focusing only on the
search feature of unemployment.2 Many take one of the following classiﬁcations: “un-
employment is searching and nonparticipation is not-searching” and “unemployment is
an active search and nonparticipation is an inactive search.”
The “searching versus not-searching” classiﬁcation gives rise to the problem that no
one can move directly from nonparticipation to employment. Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) argue that the direct ﬂows from nonparticipation to employment are due to
misclassiﬁcation problems, so called time aggregate bias : any person now have a job
must have made some eﬀort, which cannot be detected by labor force surveys. Thus
several authors take this classiﬁcation and adjust the time period of the model.3 The
method to adjust the time period of the model makes it hard to interpret other transition
rates. Is the monthly transition rate from unemployment to employment generated by
a weekly model consistent with the actual monthly transition rate? Therefore, we need
more sophisticated methods to explain the direct transition from nonparticipation to
employment.
The “active versus inactive search” classiﬁcation helps produce the direct transition
from nonparticipation to employment, but generates the counterfactual implications.
In this paper, I evaluate the matching model with “active versus inactive search” clas-
siﬁcation as in Kim (2004) and Pries and Rogerson (2004) (hereafter KPR). Based on
the reduced-form dynamics derived from the KPR matching model, I show that the
KPR matching model predicts that: (1) the unemployment/population ratio is only
one and half times more volatile than the employment/population ratio, (2) the model
accounts for less than 20 percent of the actual volatility of the unemployment rate, and
1See http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm
2Among others, see Kim (2004), Pries and Rogerson (2004), Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Haefke
and Reiter (2006) for the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model, Veracierto (2004) for the
Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model, and Tripier (2005) for the real business cycle model.
3See Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and Haefke and Reiter (2006). For example, Haefke and Reiter
(2006) choose one week as a model period and match the monthly transition rates, but their job is not
quite successful.
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(3) perfect correlations between the labor market variables are observed.
For that reason, I modify the matching model in several ways: First, those who do
not engage in job search are classiﬁed as out of the labor force. Second, the employed
consist of both those who have been working and those who search and ﬁnd employ-
ment. Then the transition from nonparticipation to employment occurs between two
consecutive periods, and it is not necessary to assume that nonparticipants are inactive
searchers. Third, although the transition rate from unemployment to employment is
much higher than the transition rate from nonparticipation to employment, the con-
ditional job-ﬁnding probability that a nonparticipant who reenters the labor market
faces is much higher than that an unemployed worker faces. This leads those out of the
labor force to participate in the labor market because nonparticipants have a higher
job-ﬁnding probability reservation than the unemployed.
The modiﬁed model has a couple of novel features. One is that the direct transition
from nonparticipation to employment is generated with no assumption that nonpartic-
ipants are inactive searchers and without adjusting the model period. Another novel
feature is that, as in Cole and Rogerson (1999), the reduced-form dynamics are easily
derived from the modiﬁed model, and identifying the parameters governing the model
is much easier than the KPR model.
The ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. The modiﬁed model improves signif-
icantly the KPR model and accounts for the U.S. labor market. First, the modiﬁed
model predicts that the unemployment rate is most volatile, and accounts for more
than 60 percent of the actual volatility of the unemployment rate. Second, the em-
ployment/population ratio is highly negatively correlated with both the unemploy-
ment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate, but the correlations are not ¡1.
Third, the model predicts a positive correlation between the unemployment/population
ratio and the nonparticipation rate, :61 which is very close to the data, :62. Finally, the
unemployment/population ratio is quite negatively correlated with the vacancy rate,
¡:73 so that the model predicts the very strong Beveridge relationship. This ﬁnding
is an important contribution because recent studies about the labor market ﬂuctua-
tions with the endogenous participation predict that unemployment is highly positively
correlated with vacancy.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses and compares the diﬀerent
labor force classiﬁcations, and introduces matching models. Section 3 quantiﬁes the
KPR model and the modiﬁed model, and Section 4 states my conclusions.
4See Tripier (2004) and Veracierto (2004).
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2 The Model
The model economy is a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching
model which consists of workers and ﬁrms (or entrepreneurs). Both workers and ﬁrms
are homogeneous. Since there is no participation decision in the standard matching
model, I assume that workers can be not only employed or unemployed, but also out
of the labor force.
2.1 Environments
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral workers with total mass equal
to one. Each worker has preferences deﬁned by
E0
1X
t=0
¯tct (1)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor and ct is consumption which takes the following
values depending upon the worker’s labor market status: wt if the worker is working, b
if the worker is searching for a job, and 0 if the worker is out of the labor force.
There are also inﬁnitely many risk-neutral ﬁrms in this economy. Each ﬁrm has
preferences deﬁned by
E0
1X
t=0
¯tct (2)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor and ct consumption. In a certain period, ﬁrms
can be active or vacant. An active ﬁrm is one that is matched with a worker and is
currently producing output z, where z is assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs:
ln z0 = ½z ln z + ²0 (3)
where ² follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance ¾2² . The steady state
productivity level is normalized to 1. All active ﬁrms confront exogenous separation
with probability ¸. A vacant ﬁrm is one that is posting a vacant position and looking
for workers. All vacant ﬁrms ﬁnd workers with probability q. I assume that ﬁrms pay
k units of the consumption good to post a vacancy.
A constant-returns-to-scale matching function is assumed:
m(s; v) = !s°v1¡° (4)
where s is the number of job-searchers expressed as an eﬃciency unit, v the number
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of vacancies, ° the elasticity of the matching function, and ! a matching function
parameter. The probability that a worker in the labor market ﬁnds a job, p, is given
by
p =
m
s
= !µ1¡° (5)
and the probability that a worker entering the labor market ﬁnds a job, f , is given by
f = e
m
s
= e!µ1¡° (6)
where is µ is the vacancy/searcher ratio, and e the relative search intensity or eﬃciency.
The worker-ﬁnding probability is
q =
m
v
= !µ¡° (7)
In what follows, I introduce two diﬀerent labor force classiﬁcations: one made by Kim
(2004) and Pries and Rogerson (2004) and the other by Moon (2007)
2.2 Classiﬁcations
2.2.1 Unemployment Before Matches Take Place
First, I describe the labor force classiﬁcation that KPR make to account for U.S. labor
market ﬂows. Especially, Figure 1 presents the ﬂow chart describing how workers move
between labor force states within a given period.
At the beginning of a certain period, there are two types of workers: matched
workers and unmatched workers. Matched workers have employment opportunities,
but unmatched workers do not.
First, matched workers choose to work on their current jobs with probability 1¡ ´
or not to work with probability ´. Matched workers choosing not to work become
unmatched workers. If a matched worker chooses to work, then (s)he is classiﬁed as
employed. Conditional on working, workers separate with probability ¸ at the end of a
certain period. Those who separate become unmatched, and those who do not separate
remain matched in the subsequent period.
Second, unmatched workers choose to look for work actively with probability ¹ or
look for work inactively with probability 1 ¡ ¹. Unmatched workers choosing active
searches are classiﬁed as unemployed. Conditional on searching, workers ﬁnd jobs with
probability p. Those who ﬁnd employment become matched, and those who do not
ﬁnd employment become unmatched at the beginning of the subsequent period. If an
unmatched worker chooses an inactive search, then (s)he is classiﬁed as out-of-the-labor-
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Figure 1: Flow Chart When Nonparticipation is an Inactive Search
force (OLF ). Conditional on searching inactively, unmatched workers ﬁnd employment
with a diﬀerent probability, say f . In the KPR model, it is assumed that p is greater
than f , because those who search actively enjoy a higher job-ﬁnding probability than
those who search inactively. At the end of the period, those who ﬁnd employment
become matched, and those who do not ﬁnd employment become unmatched.
Table 1 reports the probabilities of transition between diﬀerent labor force states
for the U.S. labor market. The transition rate from unemployment to employment
(hereafter the UE transition rate) is about 22:3 percent and the transition rate from
OLF to employment about 2:8 percent. Based on this fact, Kim (2004) and Pries
and Rogerson (2004) set the steady-state probability of the unemployed ﬁnding a job
to 22:3 percent and the steady-state probability of the nonparticipant ﬁnding a job
to 2:8 percent, respectively. Unemployed workers’ search intensity being unity, the
relative search intensity of nonparticipants, denoted by x, is about 1=8(= 2:8=22:3).
The eﬃciency unit of job-searchers is expressed as s = U + xO, where U denotes the
number of unemployed workers and O the number of nonparticipants.
2.2.2 Unemployment After Matches Take Place
In this subsection, I introduce another way classifying workers in which they are classi-
ﬁed after matches take place. At the beginning of each period, there are three types of
workers (based on the classiﬁcations made one period before): employed, unemployed,
and out of the labor force. Employed workers choose to work on their current jobs with
probability 1 ¡ ´ or not to work with probability ´. If an employed worker chooses
not to work, then (s)he is classiﬁed as OLF. Conditional on working, workers separate
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Table 1: The Gross Labor-Force Transition Rates for the CPS, 1978-2005, Percent Per
Month
(1) Unadjusted
To
Working Unemployed Not in Labor Force
Working 95.62 1.49 2.89
From Unemployed 26.66 51.23 22.11
Not in Labor Force 4.63 2.56 92.82
(2) Adjusted with the Abowd and Zellner (1985, Table 5) correction
To
Working Unemployed Not in Labor Force
Working 97.05 1.19 1.76
From Unemployed 22.33 63.42 14.25
Not in Labor Force 2.79 2.27 94.94
Source: Robert Shimer’s tabulations of raw data from the CPS
with probability ¸ at the end of that period. Those who separate are classiﬁed as
unemployed, and those who do not separate are classiﬁed as employed.
Unemployed workers choose to look for work with probability ¼ or not to look for
work with probability 1 ¡ ¼. If unemployed workers choose not to search, then they
are classiﬁed as OLF. Conditional on searching, workers ﬁnd a job with probability
p. Those who ﬁnd employment are classiﬁed as employed, and those who do not ﬁnd
employment are classiﬁed as unemployed.
Nonparticipants choose to look for work with probability » or not with probability
1 ¡ ». If a nonparticipant chooses not to search, then (s)he is classiﬁed as OLF. Con-
ditional on entering the labor force, nonparticipants ﬁnd employment with probability
f . Those who ﬁnd employment are classiﬁed as employed, and those who do not are
classiﬁed as unemployed. Figure 2 summarizes the worker ﬂows.
Note that nonparticipants’ job-ﬁnding probability, f , is deﬁned as a conditional
probability: conditional on participating in the labor force and searching for work, a
nonparticipant ﬁnds a job with a certain speciﬁed probability. Similarly, the unem-
ployed workers’ job-ﬁnding probability, p, is also deﬁned as a conditional probability:
conditional on not being out of the labor force, an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job with
probability p. The steady-state conditional job-ﬁnding probabilities are then given by
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Figure 2: Flow Chart When Nonparticipation is Not Searching
about 26 percent for the unemployed and 55 percent for the nonparticipants:
Pr(UEjLaborForce) = hUE
hUE + hUU
=
22:33%
22:33% + 63:42%
= 26:04% (8)
Pr(OEjLaborForce) = hOE
hOE + hOU
=
2:79%
2:79% + 2:27%
= 55:17% (9)
where hUE is the transition rate from unemployment to employment, for instance. If
a nonparticipant decides to search, then (s)he will have about two times higher job-
ﬁnding probability that an unemployed worker will. Let y denote the relative search
eﬃciency:
y =
Pr(OEjLaborForce)
Pr(UEjLaborForce) = 2:12 (10)
The number of searchers is then s = ¼U + y»O, where U and O are the number of
unemployed workers and the number of nonparticipants, respectively.
2.3 Equilibrium
The individual worker’s and ﬁrm’s problems can be formulated recursively. The state
of the economy is described by (z; '), where z is aggregate productivity and ' is the
distribution of workers.
2.3.1 Unemployment Before Matches Take Place
Let V w(z; ') denote the value function of a worker who works, V s(z; ') the value
function of a worker who searches actively, V o(z; ') the value function of a worker who
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searches inactively, V M(z; ') the value function of a matched worker, and V N(z; ') the
value function of an unmatched worker:
The value function of a worker who works (or an employed worker) is given by
V w(z; ') = w(z; ') + ¯
n
(1¡ ¸)Ez
£
V M(z0; '0)
¤
+ ¸Ez
£
V N(z0; '0)
¤o
(11)
where w(z; ') is a Nash bargaining wage and ¸ the exogenous separation rate. A
worker earns wages in the current period, and in the subsequent period if the match
survives with probability 1 ¡ ¸, then the worker becomes matched. However, if the
match is dissolved exogenously with probability ¸, then the worker becomes unmatched.
The value functions of a matched worker and of an unmatched worker, V M(z; ') and
V N(z; '), are given as follows
V N(z; ') = ¹V s(z; ') + (1¡ ¹)V o(z; ') (12)
V M(z; ') = (1¡ ´)V w(z; ') + ´V N(z; ') (13)
An unmatched worker who has no employment opportunities decides whether to search
actively or inactively, depending on probability ¹. A matched worker who has employ-
ment opportunities decides whether to work on his current job or not, depending on
probability ´.
The value function of a worker who searchers actively (or an unemployed worker)
is given by
V s(z; ') = b+ ¯
n
p(z; ')Ez
£
V M(z0; '0)
¤
+
¡
1¡ p(z; ')¢Ez£V N(z0; '0)¤o (14)
where p(z; ') is the job-ﬁnding probability. A worker who looks for work actively
receives unemployment insurance beneﬁts b in the current period, and in the subsequent
period ﬁnds a job with probability p(z; '). If a worker ﬁnds a job, then (s)he becomes
matched. Otherwise, (s)he becomes unmatched.
The value function of a worker who searches inactively (or a nonparticipant) is given
by
V o(z; ') = ¯
n
f(z; ')Ez
£
V M(z0; '0)
¤
+
¡
1¡ f(z; ')¢Ez£V N(z0; '0)¤o (15)
where f(z; ') is the job-ﬁnding probability given by xp(z; '), where x < 1 captures
the relative search intensity. A worker who looks for work inactively ﬁnds a job with
probability f(z; '). If a worker ﬁnds a job, then (s)he becomes matched. Otherwise,
(s)he becomes unmatched.
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Let J(z; ') denote the value function of a ﬁrm matched with a worker. The value
function of this matched ﬁrm is given by
J(z; ') = z ¡ w(z; ') + ¯(1¡ ¸)Ez [(1¡ ´)J(z0; '0)] (16)
where z is output, w(z; ') a Nash bargaining wage, and the remaining term the dis-
counted expected values of the match weighted by the probability that the match
survives, 1¡ ¸.
The equilibrium number of job vacancies is determined by the following free-entry
condition which states that vacancies earn zero proﬁts:
k = ¯q(z; ')Ez [(1¡ ´)J(z0; '0)] (17)
where k is the job posting cost, and q(z; ') the worker-ﬁnding probability.
Let S(z; ') denote the match surplus between a worker and a ﬁrm. The match
surplus is deﬁned to be the diﬀerence in the sum of the payoﬀs of the worker and the
ﬁrm:
S(z; ') = V w(z; ')¡ V o(z; ') + J(z; ') (18)
Note that the threat point of the worker is the value from being out of the labor force.
A worker who breaks up the match is then out of the labor force, but never becomes a
job-seeker because (s)he cannot ﬁnd a better wage through a search in this framework.
The wage is derived by assuming that ﬁxed fractions of the surplus accrue to the
worker and the ﬁrm. The total match surplus is shared in accordance with the following
Nash product:
w(z; ') = argmax (V w(z; ')¡ V o(z; '))® J(z; ')1¡® (19)
where ® is the worker’s bargaining power, which is set to equal the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to search, ° = ®, so that the Hosios (1990) rule is
satisﬁed. Following Hall (2005), I assume that wages are rigid over the business cycle
so that they are given by w(z; ') = w(z¤; '¤) for all z and ', where z¤ is the steady
state productivity, '¤ the steady state distribution of workers, and w(z¤; '¤) the Nash
bargaining wage at (z¤; '¤).
Finally, the evolution of the aggregate state is described by the function T (z; '),
where for each (z; ') this function speciﬁes a distribution over the next period’s values
of the state variables.
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The recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions, job- and worker-ﬁnding prob-
abilities and wages such that:
1. Taking the probabilities and the wages as given, workers and ﬁrms solve their
value functions (11)-(16),
2. The free-entry condition (17) is satisﬁed,
3. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining (19), and
4. For each (z; '), decisions generate a distribution over the next period’s state that
is consistent with the distribution given by T (z; ').
2.3.2 Unemployment After Matches Take Place
I describe the equilibrium of the model when workers are classiﬁed after matches take
place. Except for the worker’s value functions and the job-ﬁnding probabilities, other
functions are the same as ones deﬁned in the previous section.
Let V w(z; ') denote the value function of a worker who works, V sp (z; ') the value
function of a worker who was classiﬁed as unemployed in the previous period and who
searches in the current period, V sf (z; ') the value function of a worker who was classiﬁed
as OLF in the previous period and who searches in the current period, and V o(z; ')
the value function of a worker who does not search in the current period.
The value function of a worker who works is given by
V w(z; ') = w(z; ') + ¯(1¡ ¸)Ez [´V o(z0; '0) + (1¡ ´)V w(z0; '0)]
+¯¸Ez
£
¼V sp (z
0; '0) + (1¡ ¼)V o(z0; '0)¤ (20)
where w(z; ') is a Nash bargaining wage and ¸ the exogenous separation rate. A worker
earns wages in the current period, and in the subsequent period if the match survives
with probability 1 ¡ ¸, then the worker will have to decide whether to continue or
terminate the match, depending on probability ´. However, if the match is dissolved
exogenously with probability ¸, then the worker will decide whether to search with
probability ¼.
The value function of a worker who was classiﬁed as unemployed in the previous
period and searches in the current period is given by
V sp (z; ') = b+ ¯p(z; ')Ez [´V
o(z0; '0) + (1¡ ´)V w(z0; '0)]
+¯(1¡ p(z; '))Ez
£
¼V sp (z
0; '0) + (1¡ ¼)V o(z0; '0)¤ (21)
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where p(z; ') is the job-ﬁnding probability. A worker who looks for work receives
unemployment insurance beneﬁts b in the current period, and in the subsequent period
ﬁnds a job with probability p(z; '). If a worker ﬁnds a job, then (s)he will choose to
work on that job or not, depending on probability ´. Otherwise, (s)he will have to
decide whether to search again or not, with probability ¼.
The value function of a worker who was classiﬁed as OLF in the previous period
and searches in the current period is given by
V sf (z; ') = ¯f(z; ')Ez [´V
o(z0; '0) + (1¡ ´)V w(z0; '0)]
+¯(1¡ f(z; '))Ez
£
¼V sp (z
0; '0) + (1¡ ¼)V o(z0; '0)¤ (22)
where f(z; ') is the job-ﬁnding probability with f(z; ') = yp(z; '). Note that a worker
who was out of the labor force in the last period and is looking for work in the current
period does not receive unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
Finally, the value function of a worker who does not search is given by
V o(z; ') = ¯Ez
£
»V sf (z
0; '0) + (1¡ »)V o(z0; '0)¤ (23)
A worker does not search in the current period decides whether to search or not in the
subsequent period with probability ».
The recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions, job- and worker-ﬁnding prob-
abilities and wages such that:
1. Taking the probabilities and the wages as given, workers and ﬁrms solve their
value functions (20)-(23) and (16),
2. The free-entry condition (17) is satisﬁed,
3. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining (19), and
4. For each (z; '), decisions generate a distribution over the next period’s state that
is consistent with the distribution given by T (z; ').
2.4 Reduced-Form Labor Market Dynamics
Following Cole and Rogerson (1999), I characterize the implications of the models for
the time series. For simplicity, the population size is normalized to unity. Let Et, Ut
and Ot denote the number of employed workers (employment/population ratio), the
number of unemployed workers (unemployment/population ratio) and the number of
nonparticipants (nonparticipation rate), respectively.
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2.4.1 Unemployment Before Matches Take Place
From the KPR model and their classiﬁcation, the following system of equations of the
reduced-form labor market dynamics can be derived. Time t matched workers, Mt, and
unmatched workers, Nt, are given as follows:
Mt = (1¡ ¸)Et¡1 + pt¡1Ut¡1 + ft¡1Ot¡1
Nt = ¸Et¡1 + (1¡ pt¡1)Ut¡1 + (1¡ ft¡1)Ot¡1
Time t employment/population ratio, unemployment/population ratio and nonpartic-
ipation rate can be expressed in terms of time t matched workers and unmatched
workers:
Et = (1¡ ´)Mt (24)
Ut = ¹ (´Mt +Nt) (25)
Ot = (1¡ ¹) (´Mt +Nt) (26)
Note that the nonparticipation rate depends on the job-ﬁnding probabilities, pt¡1 and
ft¡1. Using Mt+Nt = 1, we have the law of motion for the unemployment/population
ratio expressed in terms of Et:
Ut = ¹ (1¡ Et) (27)
which implies that Corr(E;U) = ¡1 and Std(U) = ¹Std(E). The relative standard
deviation of the unemployment/population ratio, expressed as a ratio to the standard
deviation of the employment/population ratio, is simply ¹. We also ﬁnd the relationship
between the unemployment/poplation ratio and the nonparticipation rate:
Ot =
µ
1¡ ¹
¹
¶
Ut (28)
which implies that Corr(U;O) = 1 and Std(O) =
³
1¡¹
¹
´
Std(U). The relative standard
deviation of the nonparticipation rate, expressed as a ratio to the standard deviation
of the employment/population ratio, is 1 ¡ ¹. In addition, over the business cycle
frequencies, the HP-ﬁltered series of logUt and logOt move together.
Suppose, for example, that in a steady state the unemployment/population ratio
is 4 percent and the nonparticipation rate 36 percent. The probability of an active
job search, ¹, is given by :1 (4 percent divided by 40 percent). Then, the relative
standard deviation of the unemployment/population ratio is :1 and the relative standard
deviation of the nonparticipation rate is :9. Therefore, the model predicts that the
13
nonparticipation rate has nine times more variations than unemployment/population
ratio does.
The KPR matching model, therefore, gives the following implications: (1) the cor-
relations between the employment/population ratio and the unemployment/population
ratio, and between the employment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate are
¡1; (2) the correlation between the unemployment/population ratio and the nonpartic-
ipation rate is 1; (3) the relative standard deviation of the unemployment/population,
expressed as a ratio to the standard deviation of the employment/population ratio, is
¹ in levels; and (4) the relative standard deviation of the nonparticipation rate is 1¡¹
in levels. Note that the relative standard deviations of the unemployment/population
ratio and the nonparticipation rate are irrelevant to ´.
2.4.2 Unemployment After Matches Take Place
The model-implied times series of the employment/population ratio, the unemploy-
ment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate are as follows:
Et = (1¡ ´)(1¡ ¸)Et¡1 + ¼pt¡1Ut¡1 + »ft¡1Ot¡1 (29)
Ut = (1¡ ´)¸Et¡1 + ¼(1¡ pt¡1)Ut¡1 + »(1¡ ft¡1)Ot¡1 (30)
Ot = ´Et¡1 + (1¡ ¼)Ut¡1 + (1¡ »)Ot¡1 (31)
Note that the nonparticipation rate is independent of the job-ﬁnding probabilities, pt¡1
and ft¡1. Recall that in the KPR matching model, the nonparticipation rate is a
function of the job-ﬁnding probabilities. The KPR matching model predicts the linear
relationships between the employment/population ratio, the unemployment/population
ratio and the nonparticipation rate, which imply the perfect correlations. The modiﬁed
model, however, does not give any linear relationship between the variables, and no
perfect correlations are derived.
Another advantage of the modiﬁed model is that the UE and OE transition rates,
¼p and »f , are directly identiﬁed from the data. In particular, the OE transition rate,
»f , consists of two parts: the probability of a nonparticipant entering the labor force
(»), and the job-ﬁnding probability conditional on participation in the labor force (f).
Although we observe that the UE transition rate is higher than the OE transition rate,
this does not necessarily imply that p is greater than f . Suppose that is p less than f .
If the probability of remaining unemployed, ¼, is much higher than the probability of
entering the labor force, », then a higher UE transition rate can be observed.
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Table 2: Calibration to the U.S. Labor Market
Parameters Notation KPR Modiﬁed
Discount factor ¯ .9967 .9967
Workers’ bargaining power ® .5 .5
Matching function elasticity ° .5 .5
Unemployed income b .28 .264
Prob. of an unemployed worker
remaining in the labor force ¼ - .8575
Prob. of a nonparticipant
entering the labor force » - .0506
Unemployed workers’ conditional
job-ﬁnding probability p .2233 .2604
Nonparticipants’ conditional
job-ﬁnding probability f .0279 .5517
Prob. of a matched worker
leaving the labor force ´ - .0187
Prob. of an employed worker
being laid oﬀ ¸ .0302 .0117
Worker-ﬁnding probability q .5 .5
Vacancy/searcher ratio µ .4466 .5209
Matching function constant ! .3342 .3609
Job-posting cost k 4.2672 4.9879
Persistence of productivity shock ½z .97 .97
Standard deviation of shock ¾² .01 .01
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the models to the U.S. data and evaluate them quantitatively. The models
operate at a monthly frequency, and therefore the discount factor is set to ¯ = :9967,
equivalent to an annual interest rate of 4 percent. Workers’ bargaining power (®) and
the matching function elasticity with respect to search (°) are set to :5. Following
Shimer (2005), the level of unemployment beneﬁts (or the replacement ratio) is set to
40 percent of the steady-state wage.5
Following Andolfatto (1996), I set the worker-ﬁnding probability to .5 which is con-
sistent with an average vacancy duration of about 45 days.6 Accordingly, the steady-
state vacancy/searcher ratio (µ¤) and matching function parameter (!) are pinned down.
5The level of unemployment insurance beneﬁts is about :28 for both cases.
6Andolfatto (1996) sets the worker-ﬁnding probability to .9 at quarterly frequencies. At monthly
frequencies, it is about .5
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That is, µ¤ = p¤=q¤ and ! = p¤µ¤°¡1. Finally, the persistence parameter of the pro-
ductivity shock, ½z, is set to .97. The standard deviations of the innovation to the
productivity shock, ¾², is set to 1 percent.
3.1.1 Unemployment Before Matches Take Place
The steady-state probability that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job, p¤, is set to the UE
transition rate, 22:33 percent, and the steady-state probability that a nonparticipant
ﬁnds a job, f ¤, is set to the OE transition rate, 2:79 percent. The relative search
intensity is given by x = f ¤=p¤ < 1. The probabilities of a worker being laid oﬀ and of
an unmatched worker searching for a job are calculated from the steady-state condition
of the reduced-form labor market dynamics:
¸ =
p¤U¤ + f ¤O¤
E¤
(32)
¹ =
U¤
U¤ +O¤
(33)
where E¤, U¤ and O¤ are the steady-state employment/population ratio, unemploy-
ment/population ratio and nonparticipation rate, respectively. Since the relative stan-
dard deviations are independent of ´, ´ is set to 0.
3.1.2 Unemployment After Matches Take Place
The probability that an unemployed worker remains in the labor force is set to ¼ =
hUE + hUU . The steady-state probability that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job is
p¤ = hUE=(hUE + hUU). The probability that a nonparticipant enters the labor force is
set to » = hOE + hOU . The steady-state probability that a nonparticipant ﬁnds a job
is f ¤ = hOE=(hOE + hOU). The probabilities of a worker leaving the labor force and of
being laid oﬀ are calculated from the steady-state condition of the reduced-form labor
market dynamics:
´ =
»O¤ ¡ (1¡ ¼)U¤
E¤
(34)
¸ =
(1¡ ¼ + ¼p¤)U¤ ¡ »(1¡ f ¤)O¤
(1¡ ´)E¤ (35)
The relative search eﬃciency is given by y = f¤=p¤ > 1. All parameters are summarized
in Table 2.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the CPS, 1978-2005
(1) Level Variables
E U O u
Mean (%) 61.67 4.06 34.28 6.19
Standard deviation (%) 1.90 .87 1.23 1.41
(1.00) ( .46) ( .65) ( .74)
Correlation
E 1.00 -.86 -.93 -.89
U 1.00 .61 1.00
O 1.00 .66
(2) Cyclical Variables
lnE lnU lnO lnu
Standard deviation (%) 1.21 12.99 .72 13.22
(1.00) (10.75) (.60) (10.94)
Correlation
lnE 1.00 -.96 -.78 -.96
lnU 1.00 .62 1.00
lnO 1.00 .64
Sample period: Jan.1978-Dec.2005. The seasonally adjusted BLS series are used: employ-
ment/population ratio (E), unemployment/population ratio (U), nonparticipation rate (O), and un-
employment rate (u = U=(E+U)) for those aged 16 years and over as provided by the BLS. The relative
standard deviations, as expressed a ratio to the standard deviation of employment, are given in the
parentheses. Cyclical variables are obtained by a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
900,000.
3.2 Simulations
The time period of the models is 336 months, and the associated statistics are obtained
by 100 simulations. I report both level and cyclical variables. The cyclical variables
are obtained by a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 900,000. The main
purpose of the paper is to investigate to what extent both models are able to explain the
volatilities of the employment/population ratio, the unemployment/population ratio
and the nonparticipation rate. Table 3 describes the U.S. data.
3.2.1 Unemployment Before Matches Take Place
In this subsection I evaluate the KPR model numerically in which unemployment is an
active search and nonparticipation is an inactive search. I investigate to what extent the
model is able to explain the volatilities of the labor market variables and the correlations
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Table 4: Model Results
(1) Level Variables
U.S. data KPR Model Modiﬁed Model
Standard deviations
Std(E) 1.90% 1.15% .58%
Std(U)=Std(E) .46 .11 .44
Std(O)=Std(E) .65 .89 .62
Std(u)=Std(E) .74 .25 .72
Std(V )=Std(E) - .34 .48
Correlations
Corr(E;U) -.86 -1.00 -.92
Corr(E;O) -.93 -1.00 -.96
Corr(U;O) .61 1.00 .78
Corr(U; V ) - -.63 -.83
(2) Cyclical Variables
U.S. data KPR Model Modiﬁed Model
Standard deviations
Std(E) 1.21% 1.09% .55%
Std(U)=Std(E) 10.75 1.60 7.85
Std(O)=Std(E) .60 1.60 1.06
Std(u)=Std(E) 10.94 2.44 8.21
Std(V )=Std(E) - 7.44 10.60
Correlations
Corr(E;U) -.96 -1.00 -.88
Corr(E;O) -.78 -1.00 -.91
Corr(U;O) .62 1.00 .61
Corr(U; V ) -.91 -.44 -.73
Averages over 100 simulations of length 336 months. u denotes the unemployment rate. Cyclical
variables are obtained by an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 900,000. The seasonally adjusted
monthly help-wanted advertising index V is constructed by the Conference Board.
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between them.
Table 4 (KPR Model) shows the same results as what the reduced-form analysis
implies. The relative standard deviation of the unemployment/population ratio, ex-
pressed as the ratio to the standard deviation of the employment/population ratio, is
8 time greater than that of the nonparticipation rate in level variables. For cyclical
variables, the relative volatility of the unemployment/populatin ratio, 1:6, is the same
as one of the nonparticipation rate. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the model accounts for only
20 percent of the actual volatility of the unemployment rate.
The correlations of the employment/population ratio with both the unemploy-
ment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate are ¡1 and the correlation be-
tween the unemployment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate is 1. The
model predicts a weak negative relationship between the unemployment/population
ratio and the vacancy rate with correlation of ¡:44 which is less than the half of the
actual relationship of the U.S. data, ¡:91.
3.2.2 Unemployment After Matches Take Place
I return to the modiﬁed model in which nonparticipation is not searching and unemploy-
ment captures both those who search but do not ﬁnd employment and those who work
but separate. Table 4 (Modiﬁed Model) shows the moments of the model-generated
data.
The modiﬁed model gives better results than the KPR model does. The relative
volatilities of the unemployment/population ratio and the nonparticipation rate are 7:85
and 1:06, respectively. Compared with the KPR model, the relative volatility of the
unemployment/population ratio increases about ﬁve times, and the relative volatility
of the nonparticipation rate decreases one-third. The modiﬁed model predicts much
more volatile unemployment rate than the KPR model does, so that it accounts for
three-quarters of the actual volatility of the unemployment rate.
The correlation between the unemployment/population ratio and the nonpartici-
pation rate (:61) is very close to the actual number (:62). Moreover the Beveridge
relationship between the unemployment/population ratio and the vacancy rate is much
stronger in the modiﬁed model than in the KPR model, and is also very close to the
actual data.
In spite of all the advantages, however, the model predicts that the nonparticipation
rate is highly negatively correlated with the employment/population ratio than what
the data shows.
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Table 5: Correlations of the UE transition rate with ¼ and », CPS
Corr(hUE; ¼) Corr(hUE; »)
Feb 1978 - Jun 1985 -.61 .50
Nov 1985 - Dec 1993 -.39 .42
Oct 1995 - Dec 2005 -.24 .32
hUE is the UE transition rate. All variables are detrended by an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
900,000.
3.3 Discussion
I calibrate ¼ and » to the transition rates adjusted with the method that Abowd and
Zellner (1985) propose because there are serious misclassiﬁcation problems with the
gross ﬂows data derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS). I apply their
adjustment under the assumption that these biases are time-invariant, as in Abraham
and Shimer (2002) and Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005). The assumption is necessary
because Abowd and Zellner (1985) use only 6 years data, January 1977 - December
1982.
I ﬁnd that ¼ is 77:9 percent and » is 7:2 percent using the unadjusted transition
rates while ¼ and » are 85:8 percent and 5:1 percent, respectively, using the adjusted
transition rate. The Abowd and Zellner (1985) correction increases the UU transition
rate, but decreases the UE transition rate and the transition rates from OLF to the
labor force. The diﬀerences then are about 8 percent for ¼ and 2 percent for ». Since
the nonparticipation rate depends on (1 ¡ ¼)U and (1 ¡ »)O, the coeﬃcients play an
important role in explaining the cyclical behavior of the labor market variables. If a
more recent correction measure was available, then I could evaluate the model better.
One may argue that the probabilities, ¼ and », are not constant over time, but
are moving with the labor market conditions. I look at the correlations of the UE
transition rate with ¼ and ». Since the UE transition rate, ¼ and » have some missing
observations, I split the entire sample into 3 sub-samples: February 1978 - June 1985,
November 1985 - December 1993 and October 1995 - December 2005. The correlations
of the UE transition rate which captures the labor market conditions with ¼ and » are a
bit strong for the ﬁrst sub-sample, whereas for the most recent and longest sub-sample,
Oct 1995 - Dec 2005, the correlations are very weak, -.24 and .32, respectively.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that existing matching models with unemployment as an active
search and nonparticipation as an inactive search predict counterfactual business-cycle
results.
This paper proposes a modiﬁed matching model in which workers are classiﬁed after
matches take place and the distinction between unemployment and nonparticipation
becomes clear. That is, those who do not engage in job search are classiﬁed as out
of the labor force, and those who search and ﬁnd no employment are classiﬁed as
unemployed, consistent with the deﬁnition of the CPS.
As a result, the modiﬁed model generates the direct transition from nonparticipation
to employment with no assumption that nonparticipation is an inactive search and
without adjusting the time period of the model. In addition, some parameters which
governing the model is easily identiﬁed by the reduced-form dynamics derived from the
model.
The modiﬁed model accounts for the U.S. labor market much better than the the
existing models do. It explains three-quarters of the actual volatility of the unemploy-
ment rate, realistic contemporaneous correlations between the labor market variables,
and the Beveridge relationship.
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